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court. Rather than proposing a uniform interpretation of “substantially
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should apply Chevron and, where appropriate, defer to an agency’s conclusion that a rule is not substantially the same as a rule blocked by an
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INTRODUCTION
A little after 10 a.m. on an unseasonably warm day in June 1983, Chief
Justice Warren E. Berger and the eight Associate Justices of the United
States Supreme Court took to the bench to announce the Court’s decision in
INS v. Chadha, “a relatively minor immigration case,”1 challenging the authority of one House of Congress “to invalidate [a] decision of the Executive
Branch[.]”2 The decision proved to be anything but minor.3 Speaking to a

1. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 7-2, Restricts Congress’s Right to Overrule Actions by Executive Branch, N.Y. TIMES, (June 24, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/
06/24/us/supreme-court-7-2-restricts-congress-s-right-overrule-actions-executivebranch.h
tml [https://perma.cc/3EVF-6MA6].
2. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983) (granting certiorari to determine the constitutionality of an immigration statute) (“[This case] presents a
challenge to the constitutionality of . . . the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizing
one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch,
pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to
allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.” (citations omitted)).
3. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 142 S.
Ct. 56 (mem.) (2021) (describing Chadha as a “landmark Supreme Court decision”); Synar
v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1402 (D.D.C. 1986) (describing Chadha as a “landmark
decision”).
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“half empty” courtroom,4 Chief Justice Berger, who authored the majority
opinion, announced that the Court was affirming the decision of the Ninth
Circuit,5 which held the legislative veto was unconstitutional.6 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court not only invalidated more than 200 veto provisions in more than 100 federal laws,7 but also took from Congress an increasingly used method of checking and, in some instances, overturning
rules promulgated by administrative agencies.8
Thirteen years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha, Congress enacted, and the President signed into law, the Congressional Review
Act9—a Congressional oversight tool designed to provide Congress with an
expedited method of overturning rules promulgated by administrative agencies but crafted to address the Constitutional shortcomings of the legislative
veto.10 Procedurally, the CRA requires that all federal agencies submit a
report on final agency rules to each House of Congress before a rule can
take effect.11 If Congress introduces a joint resolution of disapproval within
the statutory review period, and the President signs the joint resolution into
law or Congress overrides the President’s veto, then the “rule shall not take
effect.”12 Perhaps more importantly, the CRA provides that “[a] rule that
does not take effect . . . may not be reissued in substantially the same
form[.]”13 Thus, the CRA provides Congress and the President with both
immediate and future control over an agency’s discretionary rulemaking authority.14
Though enacted in 1996, the CRA was infrequently used in the years
following its codification in the U.S. Code.15 This changed in 2016, when
4. See Greenhouse, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See Chadha v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980)
aff’d sub nom. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
7. LAWRENCE C. DODD & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 368 (3d
ed. 1985).
8. See David A. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 259 (1982).
9. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110
Stat. 847, 868–74 (1996).
10. See Cary Coglianese & Gabriel Scheffler, What Congress’s Repeal Efforts Can
Teach Us About Regulatory Reform, 3 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 47 (2017).
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
12. § 801(b)(1), (a)(2)(B)(3)(B), (c)(1)–(2).
13. § 801(b)(2).
14. See § 801(b)(1)–(2), (c)(1).
15. See Stephen Santulli, Essay, Use of the Congressional Review Act at the Start of the
Trump Administration: A Study of Two Vetoes, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (2018)
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President-elect Donald Trump’s win in the general election—coupled with
continued Republican control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives16—provided Congress and the new Administration with a unique
opportunity to employ the rarely-used CRA to repeal a handful of
Obama-era regulations.17 And the Trump Administration did just that. Indeed, the Administration used the CRA to roll back fourteen Obama-era
regulations between January and May 2017.18 But the Trump Administration did not stop there. The Administration would go on to use the CRA
two more times: once to invalidate a Trump-era Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) rule related to arbitration,19 and again to reject CFPB
guidance related to indirect auto lending and compliance with the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.20
When the Democrats took back the White House in January 2021,
Democratic control of Congress provided the newly elected Administration
with an opportunity to use the CRA to nix rules promulgated in the waning
hours of the Trump Administration.21 Unsurprisingly, the Biden Administration took advantage of the opportunity. On June 30, 2021, President
Biden signed three CRA resolutions, which cast aside Trump-era rules

(noting that between 1996 and 2017, the CRA was only used once to invalidate an OSHA
ergonomics rule) (“Because [CRA] resolutions of disapproval require a presidential signature and an administration generally will not issue regulations with which it disagrees, CRA
[resolutions of disapproval] are likely to succeed only in periods following a presidential
transition from one party to the other.”) But see Act of Nov. 1, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-74,
131 Stat. 1243 (providing for congressional disapproval of Trump-era rule submitted for
Congressional review by Consumer Financial Protection Bureau relating to arbitration agreements).
16. See Eric Bradner, Republicans Keep Control of Congress, CNN: POLITICS (Nov. 9,
2016, 3:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/congress-balance-of-power-201
6-election/index.html [https://perma.cc/9F2P-YBUJ].
17. See Emmarie Huetteman, How Republicans Will Try to Roll Back Obama Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/congre
ssional-review-act-obama-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/T8SB-547W].
18. See Eric Lipton & Jasmine C. Lee, Which Obama-Era Rules Are Being Reversed in
the Trump Era, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017
/05/01/us/politics/trump-obama-regulations-reversed.html [https://perma.cc/P9TY-BLJA].
19. See 131 Stat. at 1243.
20. See Act of May 21, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290.
21. Ann Navaro et al., Will Congress Rollback Trump Regulatory Actions to Advance
the Biden Policy Agenda?, JD SUPRA (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/w
ill-congress-rollback-trump-regulatory-7039286/ [https://perma.cc/QB8U-KFBN].
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related to methane emissions, third-party lending, and workplace discrimination.22
While the CRA has become an increasingly effective regulatory oversight tool, its increased use has raised several legal questions. Indeed, a
party affected by a rule rejected by the Trump Administration in April 2017
filed suit in federal court alleging the CRA is unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutionally mandated process for lawmaking—bicameralism and presentment—set forth in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.23 Further, the extent of the CRA’s prohibition on future rulemaking remains
largely undefined, as courts have not handled challenges alleging agency
action, or perhaps inaction, conflicted with the CRA’s “substantially the
same form” provision.24
And the latter uncertainty could be costly. Although the exact cost of
formulating a rule is unclear,25 loose estimates suggest that rule development costs can total in the millions of dollars.26 Accordingly, an agency
acting under the assumption that it is permitted to promulgate a rule only to
have the rule stricken for violating the CRA’s future rulemaking prohibition
could impose substantial and unnecessary costs on taxpayers. Conversely,
an agency using the CRA to justify inaction notwithstanding an agency statute requiring action could also impose high costs on taxpayers via losses in
regulatory benefits.27
22. See Act of June 30, 2021, Pub L. No. 117-22, 135 Stat. 294; Act of June 30, 2021,
Pub. L. No. 117-23, 135 Stat. 295; Act of June 30, 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-24, 135 Stat. 296.
23. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 22, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, 946
F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-35629); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313
F. Supp. 3d 976, 988 (D. Alaska 2018), aff’d sub nom., Bernhardt, 946 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
2019) (concluding the CRA did not violate Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution); Bernhardt,
946 F.3d at 562 (affirming district court decision). Though the Supreme Court has yet to
weigh in on the merits of a Constitutional challenge to the CRA and the issue therefore remains unresolved, this Article focuses solely on the CRA’s effect on future rulemaking, and
does not consider or address arguments related to the CRA’s constitutionality.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
25. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS
WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS 2–3 (2009) (“[A]gency
officials informed [GAO] . . . that little systematic information existed within agencies on
the time, staffing, and contracting costs associated with the development of individual rules
or the required analyses that support rulemakings.”).
26. See id. at 21–23.
27. A draft executive document estimated the annual economic benefits of 24 EPA clean
air rules ranged from $171.1 to $667.9 billion. OFF. OF INFO. AND REGUL. AFF., OFF. OF.
MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM
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This Article aims to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the CRA by
providing a legal framework for courts dealing with allegations that agency
action or inaction is unlawful because of a prior CRA resolution of disapproval. Part II provides background on the development and use of the
CRA. Part III discusses the CRA’s provisional uncertainty. Part IV argues
courts need not adopt a uniform interpretation of the CRA’s “substantially
the same form” provision and that courts should use Chevron to evaluate
whether a reissued rule runs afoul of a CRA resolution of disapproval. Part
V suggests courts should not compel agency action following a CRA resolution unless discrete agency action is required by law.
I. THE DEMISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AND THE RISE OF THE CRA
After the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto,28 Congress
adopted the CRA as a workable alternative.29 Although Congress rarely
used the CRA in its early years, the CRA has emerged as a frequently invoked regulatory oversight tool.30
A. The Legislative Veto: A Fifty-Year Reign to Rein in Regulators
Unofficially referred to by some as “the fourth branch of government,”31 administrative agencies have long been a double-edged sword for
Congress.32 While administrative agencies offer legislators a practical tool
to more efficiently regulate in an “increasingly complex world”33 by delegating broad policymaking authority to administrative agencies, Congress

ACT 10 (2016). The estimated cost imposed by these regulations was between $41 and $47.9
billion. Id. Accordingly, agency action in the context of clean air regulations had a positive
economic impact. See id.
28. See infra Section II(A).
29. See infra Section II(B).
30. See infra Section II(B)(i)–(ii).
31. Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST (May
24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-gove
rnment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/W2MH-B4ZP].
32. See Michael Rappaport, A Stronger Separation of Powers for Administrative Agencies, THE REGULATORY REV. (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/12/18/
rappaport-stronger-separation-powers-administrative-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/8ACX-PV
A6].
33. Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162,
2164 (2009).
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has long been concerned with retaining control over these agencies.34 The
legislative veto arose as a pragmatic solution to this concern.35
Beginning in the early 1930s, legislative veto provisions provided
Congress with control over administrative agencies by requiring congressional review and approval of administrative policy decisions before implementing policy determinations.36 During the congressional review period,
Congress could reject or approve agency action via a joint resolution of both
Houses, a resolution of either House, or an act of the relevant standing committee.37 Notably, legislative veto provisions did not require the President’s
signature, which ensured congressional disapproval of agency action was
not subject to a presidential veto, and therefore provided Congress with
more autonomous decision-making.38 As a result, the legislative veto provided both “a means whereby Congress [could] write legislation giving the
executive broad discretion . . . over the fleshing out of policy while retaining for Congress the ultimate authority to approve or disapprove administrative actions.”39
Although scholars have debated the effectiveness of the legislative
veto as a check on agency policymaking discretion,40 the legislative veto
nevertheless became an increasingly common component of congressional
legislation after first emerging in executive branch reorganization proposals
in the early 1930s.41 While including veto provisions more frequently in
legislation does not necessarily indicate Congress viewed the legislative
veto as an effective check on administrative action, it suggests Congress at
least recognized the symbolic value these provisions offered.42 For proponents of either deregulation or increased agency oversight, legislative veto
provisions offered apparent victories to elected officials who promised regulatory accountability.43
But it is likely that the legislative veto was more than a symbolic boilerplate employed to appease constituents. Presidents Truman and
34. See JESSICA KORN, THE POWER
AND THE MYTH OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
4–5 (1996).

OF

35. See id. at 4.
36. See LAWRENCE C. DODD & RICHARD L. SCHOTT, CONGRESS
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 229–32 (1979).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 229–30.
39. Id. at 230.
40. See KORN, supra note 34, at 33–34.
41. See DODD & SCHOTT, supra note 36, at 230–32 tbl.6-1.
42. See KORN, supra note 34, at 44.
43. See id.
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Eisenhower both vetoed a number of bills because of veto provisions included in the legislation,44 which suggests sitting presidents recognized the
substantive power of the legislative veto. Further, the frequent inclusion of
legislative veto provisions in legislation implies Congress recognized that
the legislative veto provided an additional administrative oversight tool, regardless of whether it was the most effective or frequently used oversight
tool.45 Justice Byron R. White even noted that the “prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our contemporary political system . . . can
hardly be overstated. It has become a central means by which Congress
secures the accountability of executive and independent agencies.”46
But claims that the legislative veto was or was not an effective oversight tool does little to undermine the contention that the legislative veto
was nevertheless an oversight tool available to members of Congress beginning in the early 1930s and continuing through the early 1980s.47 Further,
the frequent inclusion of legislative veto provisions in legislation ensured
this oversight tool was widely available even if the provisions were used
infrequently or ineffectively.48
This changed in 1983 when the Supreme Court issued its decision in
INS v. Chadha, which effectively invalidated more than 200 legislative veto
provisions included in 126 different federal laws.49 In Chadha, the Court
found the legislative veto provision at issue constituted lawmaking because
it had “the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the Legislative Branch.”50 The Court reasoned
that since the legislative veto constituted lawmaking, it should adhere to the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I.51 Because the legislative veto used in Chadha was subject to neither bicameralism nor
44. See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 313–14
(1964).
45. See KORN, supra note 34, at 43 (stating that out of fourteen legislative techniques,
the legislative veto ranked ninth in effectiveness and fourteenth in frequency of use; referencing findings from Joel D. Aberbach’s comprehensive study of congressional oversight
mechanisms); see also DODD & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 7, at 380 (“[T]he very existence
of the device sensitizes officials to anticipate and forestall congressional criticism.”).
46. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–68 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting).
47. See KORN, supra note 34, at 43; see also DODD & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 7, at
368.
48. See KORN, supra note 34, at 43; see also DODD & SCHOTT, supra note 36, at 230–
32.
49. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959; see also DODD & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 7, at 368.
50. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
51. See id. at 956–58.
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presentment, the Court held the one-House legislative veto was unconstitutional.52
The implications of the Chadha decision have been far-reaching. Although the Court made it clear that the unconstitutional veto provision in
Chadha could be severed from the otherwise lawful statute,53 the holding
nevertheless affected a significant number of federal laws.54 As noted
above, there were more than 200 veto provisions included in 126 different
federal laws when the Court issued its decision in 1983.55 Consequently,
the Court’s decision invalidated over 200 legislative veto provisions, while
leaving the question of severability to a case-by-case determination.56 Beyond the decision’s effect on statutes enacted prior to the Court’s ruling, the
decision also affected future legislation. The Court’s decision made it unconstitutional for Congress to include legislative veto provisions in future
legislation absent compliance with Article I.57
B. The CRA: A Response to Chadha
Eleven years after Chadha, Congress underwent an ideological shift
when the 1994 election gave Republicans sizable majorities in both Houses
of Congress.58 Among the goals of this new Republican-controlled Congress was loosening the regulatory vice squeezing small businesses and decreasing the overall number of federal regulations.59 After a proposed moratorium on administrative regulations failed,60 a bipartisan group of
Senators crafted and unanimously passed legislation that contained an

52. See id. at 956–59.
53. See id. at 931–35 (noting § 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act “survives as
a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.”).
54. See DODD & OPPENHEIMER, supra note 7, at 368.
55. See id.
56. See James L. Sundquist, The Legislative Veto: A Bounced Check, THE BROOKINGS
REVIEW, Fall 1983, at 13, 15.
57. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 (“To accomplish what has been attempted by one
House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of
the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses
and presentment to the President.”).
58. See Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the
“Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter the
E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 711–12 (2011).
59. See id. at 712 (“[P]arty leaders were aggressive in their support of regulatory reform.”).
60. See id. at 716–17.
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oversight tool reminiscent of the legislative veto invalidated by Chadha.61
Although the House initially declined to consider the bill,62 a version of the
bill was eventually included in Title II of the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 (Contract with America), which was signed into law
by President Clinton on March 29, 1996.63
Known as the CRA, this administrative oversight tool is similar to the
legislative veto, though it attempts to address the constitutional deficiencies
identified in Chadha.64 Indeed, the Chadha Court was clear: legislative veto
provisions that do not mandate compliance with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I are unconstitutional.65 In reaching this
conclusion, however, the Court suggested that legislative review provisions
similar to the legislative veto with streamlined lawmaking provisions could
be permissible if Congress simply complied with Article I.66 The CRA was
drafted with this in mind. 67
Specifically, the CRA provides that agencies must submit all rules to
Congress for review before they can take effect.68 Further, the CRA requires that all “major rules”69 may not take effect for sixty days after the
rule is submitted to Congress for review.70 During the review period, Congress may enact a joint resolution of disapproval invalidating the rule.71 If
Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval and the President signs the
61. See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251,
110 Stat. 847, 868-874 (1996).
62. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 717–18.
63. See id. at 718; see also 110 Stat. at 868-874.
64. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08; see also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional
Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 197 (2018) (“The CRA was Congress’s attempt to devise a lawmaking procedure that would approximate a legislative veto as closely
as Chadha would allow.”).
65. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983).
66. See id. at 958 n.23 (“[Compliance with Article I] does not mean that legislation must
always be preceded by debate; on the contrary, we have said that it is not necessary for a
legislative body to ‘articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.’” (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980))).
67. See §§ 801–08.
68. Id. § 801(a)(1)(A).
69. A “major rule” is any rule that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) finds
will, or will likely, cause “(A) an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more;
(B) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State,
or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or (C) significant adverse effects on
competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United
States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises[.]” Id. §§ 804(2)(A)–(C).
70. Id. §§ 801(a)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
71. See id. § 801(b)(1).
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resolution into law or Congress overrides the veto,72 then the rule will not
take effect and the agency issuing the rule is barred from reissuing the rule
“in substantially the same form” absent an affirmative act of Congress.73
While it is unclear what “substantially the same form” means, there is no
doubt that this phrase gives the CRA its teeth.74
Without any additional procedural components, the CRA would not
provide oversight advantages otherwise available to Congress via traditional lawmaking procedures.75 Unsurprisingly then, the CRA adopts the
Court’s suggestion in Chadha and incorporates streamlined and hybrid lawmaking procedures to provide the CRA with existing oversight advantages.76 The CRA provides a mechanism for senators to bring disapproval resolutions directly to the Senate floor when the relevant committee
fails to issue a timely report on a proposed rule.77 If a committee fails to
issue a report on a proposed rule after twenty days, a petition signed by
thirty senators will bring the resolution directly to the Senate floor for consideration.78 The CRA does not give the House a similar committee bypass
procedure, though House committee review may be bypassed “when a disapproval resolution is sent from the Senate to the House[.]”79 When the
Senate sends a disapproval resolution to the House, the House may not refer
the resolution to a committee for review.80
The CRA also prevents the use of filibusters in the Senate by setting
the debate period for disapproval resolutions at no more than ten hours.81
Additionally, the CRA provides a “special extended review period for major
rules that are submitted to Congress in the final sixty days of a congressional
session.”82 Specifically, Congress is given seventy-five days to issue a joint
resolution of disapproval for major rules beginning at the start of a subsequent congressional session when a rule is submitted in the final sixty days

72. See id. § 801(a)(3)(B).
73. Id. § 801(b)(2).
74. Id.; see also Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 708–09.
75. See Note, supra note 33, at 2165.
76. See § 802 (requiring participation of both Houses of Congress when enacting a joint
resolution); see also Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58
(1983).
77. See § 802(c).
78. See id.
79. Note, supra note 33, at 2168.
80. See id.
81. See § 802(d)(2).
82. Note, supra note 33, at 2168; see also §§ 801(d), 802(e)(2).
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of the preceding congressional session.83 Further, the CRA also provides a
legislative template for issuing resolutions of disapproval.84 This template
expedites the legislative process by ensuring resolutions passed in either
House of Congress are identical and can therefore “proceed to the President
without the need for a conference report.”85
1. The CRA in Inaction
Notwithstanding the CRA’s streamlined lawmaking procedures, Congress rarely used the CRA prior to 2017.86 Although all rules issued by
administrative agencies after March 1996 have been subject to CRA review,
Congress only successfully used the CRA once between 1996 and 2017.87
In 2001, President George W. Bush signed a joint resolution voiding a Clinton-era Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) ergonomics rule.88 Between 2001 and 2017, Congress passed only five joint resolutions of disapproval.89 These were all vetoed by President Barack Obama.90
Unsurprisingly, commentators have been quick to criticize the effectiveness of the CRA as a practical “restraint on the administrative process,”91 noting that the CRA is best suited for presidential transition periods.92 And this critique makes sense: “a President would be expected to
veto a joint resolution disapproving a rule issued by the President’s own
Administration.”93 Despite scholarly contentions that the CRA is most
83. See § 802(e)(2).
84. § 802(a) (“‘Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the ____ relating to ____,
and such rule shall have no force or effect.’ (The blank spaces being appropriately filled
in).”).
85. Note, supra note 33, at 2168.
86. See id. at 2169.
87. Id.
88. See Act of Mar. 20, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (“Resolved by the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the Department of Labor relating to ergonomics
(published at 65 Fed. Reg. 68261 (2000)), and such rule shall have no force or effect.”).
89. See MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992, THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 n.19 (2021).
90. Id.
91. Note, supra note 33, at 2183.
92. See id. at 2169; see also Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 729 (“[T]he CRA may
be at its most useful when there is a significant realignment in party control over the Legislative and Executive Branches[.]”); CAREY & DAVIS, supra note 89, at 6 (“During a transition
following the inauguration of a new President . . . the CRA is more likely to be used successfully.”).
93. CAREY & DAVIS, supra note 89, at 4.
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effective during times of presidential transitions, scholars have observed
that past practice suggests that even in the context of presidential transitions,
the CRA may not be an administration’s preferred administrative oversight
tool.94
2. The CRA in Action
Despite commentary questioning the effectiveness of the CRA, the
Trump and Biden Administrations effectively used the CRA.95 For example, the Trump Administration signed sixteen joint resolutions of disapproval into law between January 2017 and May 2018.96 The negated rules
include a Department of the Interior rule limiting permissible hunting techniques for certain animals at Alaskan wildlife refuges,97 a Federal Communications Commission rule requiring broadcasting companies to solicit consumer consent before collecting and selling consumer data,98 and a Social
Security Administration rule (SSA) providing the SSA with a reporting system to provide the Department of Justice with information on mentally unstable individuals who should be barred from purchasing a firearm.99 Included among the now invalidated rules were rules promulgated by
independent agencies.100 Prior to the Trump Administration, the CRA had
never invalidated independent agency rules.101
94. See Note, supra note 33, at 2175–76 (noting that although twenty-two rules finalized
near the end of Bush’s second term were subject to CRA review and repeal, the Obama
Administration used alternative tools to rescind unpopular Bush-era administrative rules rather than the CRA).
95. See Uses of the Congressional Review Act During the Biden Administration,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Uses_of_the_Congressional_Review_Act_during_the
_Biden_administration [https://perma.cc/K35T-A92U].
96. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Trump Administration and the Congressional Review
Act, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505, 509 (2018).
97. See Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-20, 131 Stat. 86; see also Non-Subsistence
Take of Wildlife, and Public Participation and Closure Procedures, on National Wildlife
Refuges in Alaska, 81 Fed. Reg. 52248 (Fish and Wildlife Serv., Aug. 5, 2016).
98. See Act of Apr. 3, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-22, 131 Stat. 88; see also Protecting the
Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services, 81 Fed. Reg.
87274 (FCC, Dec. 2, 2016).
99. See Act of Feb. 28, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-8, 131 Stat. 15; see also Implementation
of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91702 (SSA, Dec. 19,
2016).
100. See, e.g., 131 Stat. 88 (invalidating rule promulgated by the FCC); Act of Feb. 14,
2017, Pub. L. No. 115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (invalidating rule promulgated by the SEC).
101. Before 2017, the CRA had only invalidated the OSHA Ergonomics rule. OSHA is
an executive agency located in the Department of Labor. See CAREY & DAVIS, supra note
89, at 28 app. A.
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In addition to invalidating Obama-era regulations, President Trump
signed a joint resolution negating one of his own Administration’s CFPB
rules prohibiting certain financial institutions from using pre-dispute arbitration agreements to bar consumer class actions.102 It was the first time a
sitting President used the CRA to invalidate an agency rule promulgated by
his own Administration.103 Use of the CRA continued when President
Biden assumed the presidency.104 On June 30, 2021, President Biden signed
three CRA Resolutions into law, which invalidated three administrative
rules enacted late in the Trump Administration.105
Going forward, it appears the CRA’s frequent use is poised to continue. Indeed, the Trump and Biden Administrations have both displayed
the potency of the CRA as a check on not only a previous administration’s
late term rulemaking (sometimes referred to as “midnight” rules)106 but also
on independent agencies.107 This, coupled with alternating single-party
control of the White House and Congress “at the beginning of a new president’s term,”108 and an increasingly polarized climate where “[m]ost . . . intense partisans believe the opposing party’s policies ‘are so misguided that
they threaten the nation’s well-being[,]’”109 suggests we have not seen the
last of the CRA.

102. See Act of Nov. 1, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243; see also Arbitration
Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (CFPB, July 19, 2017).
103. Prior to the Trump Administration, the CRA had only been used once by President
George W. Bush to invalidate a Clinton-era ergonomics rule. See CAREY & DAVIS, supra
note 89, at 28 app. A. Under the Trump Administration, the CRA’s initial use only invalidated Obama-era regulations. See Lipton & Lee, supra note 18.
104. See Joe Biden, President, Exec. Off. of the President, Remarks by President Biden
Signing Three Congressional Review Act Bills into Law: S.J.Res.13; S.J.Res.14; and
S.J.Res.15 (June 30, 2021) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2021/06/30/remarks-by-president-biden-signing-three-congression
al-review-act-bills-into-law-s-j-res-13-s-j-res-14-and-s-j-res-15/?utm_source=link
[https://perma.cc/HGW6-VGRH]).
105. Id.
106. See Lipton & Lee, supra note 18; see also Note, supra note 33, at 2163.
107. See supra notes 15–24 and accompanying text.
108. See Katherine Schaeffer, Single-Party Control in Washington is Common at the Beginning of a New Presidency, but Tends Not to Last Long, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 3,
2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/02/03/single-party-control-in-washingt
on-is-common-at-the-beginning-of-a-new-presidency-but-tends-not-to-last-long/ [https://pe
rma.cc/HD22-6EU9].
109. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 6
(2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-amer
ican-public/ [https://perma.cc/XHE7-DP2E] (“Republicans and Democrats are more divided
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II. UNCERTAINTY IS CERTAIN: THE CRA’S PROVISIONAL QUESTION
MARKS
While use of the CRA has increased, so too have concerns regarding
the CRA’s future effect. Indeed, when a rule is invalidated, agencies are
necessarily left with a burning question: “[w]hat kind of phoenix, if any, is
allowed to rise from [its] ashes . . . ?”110 Admittedly, if the CRA’s “substantially the same form” prohibition is interpreted too broadly, congressional invalidation of an agency rule may create tension between the joint
resolution and an agency’s delegated rulemaking authority.111 Conversely,
if the CRA’s prohibition on reissuing a rule in “substantially the same form”
is interpreted too narrowly, the joint resolution does little to limit an
agency’s future rulemaking discretion.112
Given the uncertainty surrounding the CRA’s effect on future rulemaking, it should come as no surprise that several scholars have set out to unpack the meaning of the CRA’s “substantially the same form” provision.113
Of particular relevance is the scholarship of Adam Finkel and Jason Sullivan. In their article, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of the “Substantially
Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter
the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, Finkel and Sullivan provide an overview
of the CRA and lay out seven plausible interpretations of the “substantially
the same form” provision. We briefly summarize each approach below, as
Finkel’s and Sullivan’s scholarship provides good insight into how scholars
have set out to interpret the “substantially the same form” provision of the
CRA.114
As noted above, Finkel and Sullivan identify seven possible interpretations of the CRA’s “substantially the same form” provision.115 The scholars then arrange these seven competing approaches on a spectrum ranging
from “least troublesome” to an issuing agency to “most daunting.”116 According to Finkel and Sullivan, the narrowest, and therefore least troubling,
along ideological lines—and partisan antipathy is deeper and more extensive – than at any
point in the last two decades.”).
110. Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 709.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2); see also Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 759 (“If the bar
against reissuing a rule ‘in substantially the same form’ applied to a wide swath of rules that
could be promulgated within the agency’s delegated rulemaking authority, this would be
tantamount to substantively amending the organic statute.”).
112. § 801(b)(2); see also Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 734.
113. See, e.g., Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 734–37.
114. Id. at 709–11.
115. Id. at 734.
116. Id.
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approach to interpreting the CRA’s effect on future rulemaking would permit agencies to reissue rules identical to one previously invalidated under
the CRA as long as the agency asserts external conditions have changed.117
Under this interpretation, an “agency could . . . simply claim that although
the regulation was . . . in ‘substantially the same form,’ the effect of the rule
is now substantially different . . . .”118 A related, but slightly broader interpretation advanced by Finkel and Sullivan provides for the issuance of a
rule identical to a previously rejected rule if external conditions have truly
changed.119 In this case, an identical rule may be substantially different
even if the language itself has not changed, because the effects of the regulation changed over time.120
A third interpretation of the “substantially the same” provision is that
the reissued rule must be altered so as to change the overall cost benefit
analysis (CBA) of the disapproved rule.121 Under this approach, the sameness of rules would depend on a comparison of the costs and benefits, and
not the text of the rule itself.122 A related, but slightly broader iteration of
the CBA approach to the CRA would require agencies to both alter the costs
and benefits of the rule and fix all issues Congress identified with the rejected rule prior to reissuing the rule.123
An even broader approach to determining which rules are substantially
similar is for an agency to show it has “learned its lesson” in addition to
changing the costs and benefits of the rule and fixing specific problems with
the invalidated rule.124 A related, but again broader, interpretation would
require agencies to devise a wholly different regulatory approach if it wishes
to regulate in the same area as the invalidated rule in addition to adjusting
the CBA, fixing specific problems with the rule, and showing Congress the
agency learned its lesson.125
Finally, Finkel and Sullivan suggest what may be the broadest interpretation of the provision: an agency simply cannot regulate in an area
where Congress disapproved a specific regulation.126 This expansive

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734–35.
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
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reading of “substantially the same form” has perhaps the greatest possible
chilling effect on future regulatory action.127
The range of interpretations proposed by Finkel and Sullivan highlight
the ambiguity inherent in the CRA’s “substantially the same form” provision. But these interpretations also highlight an error in the scholarly approach to interpreting the CRA’s effect on future rulemaking. Indeed,
scholars interpreting the CRA have incorrectly focused on what sameness
means with respect to the CRA, rather than what sameness means in the
context of the statute authorizing the agency to regulate. This Article proposes a different approach to understanding the future effects of a successful
joint resolution of disapproval by reframing the issue. We ask not what the
“substantially the same form” provision means in isolation, but instead focus on what a CRA resolution does to an agency’s organic statute.
III. PROPOSAL: APPLYING CHEVRON TO REISSUED RULES
Courts should apply Chevron deference to allegations that a proposed
agency rule violates the “substantially the same form” restriction because
the claim involves the lawfulness of an agency’s interpretation of its own
statute as modified by the CRA. Under this framework, agencies should be
permitted to justify inaction when alleging that promulgating a rule would
violate a CRA resolution unless rule promulgation is a discrete agency action required by law.128
A. Why Chevron Applies
The growth of the administrative state in the twentieth century,129 coupled with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) judicial review provisions,130 all but ensured courts would be involved in determining whether
regulations fall within or beyond an agency’s delegated rulemaking authority. But the court’s role in determining the lawfulness of agency rulemaking
127. See id.
128. See infra Section IV(B).
129. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 121, 122–27 (2016) (“[T]he New Deal . . . established many new regulatory agencies[.]” Id. at 123.) (“[I]n 1970, Congress began chartering new programs of so-called ‘social regulation’ devoted to public health and safety, environmental quality, and consumer
protection.” Id. at 125.).
130. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. The APA provides that courts may hold unlawful agency actions
that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with
law” or “in excess of statutory . . . authority . . . or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A), (C).
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was not without tension. Indeed, reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its
own organic statute pitted “the courts . . . quintessential judicial task of statutory interpretation”131 against Congress’s decision to delegate broad regulatory authority to an agency with expertise in a particular regulatory area.132
Implicit in this broad delegation of regulatory authority is an agency’s authority to fill in any statutory ambiguities.133
In 1984, the Supreme Court put the issue to rest when it rubber stamped
a test to determine when lower courts should afford agency interpretations
of their organic statutes heightened deference.134 The test has two prongs.135
The first prong asks if the organic statute is clear.136 Under this inquiry, the
court must determine “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear” by evaluating
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”137
If the court concludes Congress has not addressed the issue directly and the
statute is ambiguous, then the court applies the second prong, which simply
determines whether the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous statute is
a “permissible construction of the statute.”138 Accordingly, “the court does
not simply impose its own construction of the statute” under the test outlined in Chevron.139 Instead, a court will generally find an agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute unless its interpretation
is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”140 This affords agencies significant interpretive deference.141
Applying Chevron deference to a party challenging an agency’s alleged violation of the “substantially the same form” prohibition is not
straightforward.142 Although the phrase “substantially the same form” is
131. DeMuth, supra note 129, at 135.
132. See Melanie E. Walker, Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1999).
133. See id.
134. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 842.
138. Id. at 843.
139. Id.
140. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)
(quoting Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)).
141. See Kerne H.O. Matsubara, Domicile Under Immigration and Nationality Act Section 212(c): Escaping the Chevron “Trap” of Agency Deference, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1595,
1620 (“[O]nly the most egregious or erroneous interpretations . . . will fail under Chevron
step two.”).
142. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
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inherently ambiguous, Chevron deference is only afforded to an agency’s
interpretation of its own statute.143 And the CRA is a statute applicable to
rulemaking generally and is therefore not applicable to a single agency.144
Accordingly, some scholars have concluded that courts should not afford
agencies Chevron deference when a party seeks to prevent enactment of a
proposed rule on the grounds that it violates the CRA’s “substantially the
same form” prohibition because an agency enacting a rule post-CRA nullification amounts to agency interpretation of a shared statute.145 Instead,
these scholars suggest the courts should review these challenges de novo.146
Although these scholars are correct in concluding Chevron is ordinarily inapplicable to statutes of general applicability, their analysis is too conclusory. While the CRA is a statute of general applicability and is not administered by a single agency,147 the passage of a joint resolution has the
effect of modifying a statute administered by a single agency.148 Thus, an
agency enacting a rule after Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval is not interpreting the CRA; it is interpreting its organic statute as
amended by a joint resolution passed pursuant to the CRA.149 Accordingly,
a challenge to an agency’s proposed rule on the grounds that it is “substantially the same form” as a rule voided under the CRA should be entitled to
Chevron deference because the proposed rule is an agency’s interpretation
of its statute as modified by a CRA joint resolution.150
Although an agency reissuing a rule may be entitled to Chevron deference, the agency will still have to show that its interpretation of the statute
as amended by the CRA is a “permissible construction” of the statute if it
receives Chevron deference.151 To do so, an agency will need to show that
the rule is not “‘arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly

143. See id.; see also Sam Batkins & Adam J. White, Should We Fear ‘Zombie’ Regulations?, 40 REGUL. 16, 21 (2017) (“[A]s the courts have stressed, Chevron deference is appropriate only when the statute at issue is one that has been committed to that particular
agency’s exclusive administration[.]”).
144. See § 801(a)(1)(A) (“Before a rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating
such rule shall submit to each House of the Congress . . . a report containing . . . a copy of
the rule.”).
145. § 801(b)(2); see also Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21.
146. See Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21.
147. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
150. See § 801(b)(2); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 841–44 (1984).
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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contrary’” to its modified statute.152 Accordingly, the agency will need to
provide a plausible interpretation of its CRA-modified statute that explains
why the reissued rule is not “substantially the same” as a rejected rule.153
While courts have never dealt with this issue directly, scholars have nevertheless proposed agency interpretations of the CRA that could support an
agency’s decision to reissue a rule.154 Although a solution to this particular
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that “only the
most egregious or erroneous interpretations” will fail under this part of the
analysis.155
That Chevron should apply finds support in the legislative history accompanying the CRA’s enactment. As noted in Part II(B), the CRA was
originally standalone legislation developed in bipartisan negotiations between the House and Senate before being added to the Contract with America.156 Because of the somewhat circuitious development of the CRA, there
are no committee or conference reports.157 That said, some of the context
surrounding the CRA’s development and passage can be found in floor
statements and an identical statement of legislative history approved by
House and Senate sponsors.158
Senator Don Nickles and Congressman Henry Hyde submitted nearly
identical statements for the Senate and the House, respectively, to the Congressional Record.159 Because of the way the legislative history was

152. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)
(quoting Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004)).
153. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2);
154. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 58, at 734–37. An agency could argue that a
reissued rule is no longer substantially the same as an invalidated rule if it shows that external
conditions have changed such that an otherwise identical rule has a different effect now than
it did at the time of invalidation. See id. at 734–35. Further, an agency could argue that an
otherwise identical rule is not substantially the same as an invalidated rule by showing that
the reissued rule has greater benefits or reduced costs than the original rule. See id. at 735–
36.
155. See Matsubara, supra note 141, at 1620.
156. Congressional Review Act Legislative History, RED TAPE ROLLBACK, https://www.r
edtaperollback.com/cra/legislative-history/ [https://perma.cc/XV9F-CKBG]; see 142 CONG.
REC. S3683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Nickles) (submitting statement
for the record regarding Congressional Review Title of H.R. 3136); 142 CONG. REC. E571–
79 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (providing for Consideration of H.R.
3136, Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996).
157. See Congressional Review Act Legislative History, supra note 156.
158. See id. (noting that “scholars and courts have credited [the joint floor statement] as
the best evidence of congressional intent regarding and the meaning of the CRA’s text.”).
159. See id.; 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
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developed, there is no recorded floor debate and no recorded disagreement
over the meaning of the text.160
Especially relevant to this article is the excerpt below:
Subsection 801(b)(1) provides that: “A rule shall not take effect (or continue), if the Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, described
under section 802, of the rule.” Subsection 801(b)(2) provides that such a
disapproved rule “may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and
a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued,
unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted
after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.” Subsection 801(b)(2) is necessary to prevent circumvention of a resolution disapproval. Nevertheless, it may have a different impact on the issuing agencies depending on the nature of the underlying law that authorized the rule.
If the law that authorized the disapproved rule provides broad discretion to
the issuing agency regarding the substance of such rule, the agency may
exercise its broad discretion to issue a substantially different rule. If the law
that authorized the disapproved rule did not mandate the promulgation of
any rule, the issuing agency may exercise its discretion not to issue any new
rule. Depending on the law that authorized the rule, an issuing agency may
have both options. But if an agency is mandated to promulgate a particular
rule and its discretion in issuing the rule is narrowly circumscribed, the enactment of a resolution of disapproval for that rule may work to prohibit the
reissuance of any rule. The authors intend the debate on any resolution of
disapproval to focus on the law that authorized the rule and make the congressional intent clear regarding the agency’s options or lack thereof after
enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. It will be the agency’s responsibility in the first instance when promulgating the rule to determine
the range of discretion afforded under the original law and whether the law
authorizes the agency to issue a substantially different rule. Then, the
agency must give effect to the resolution of disapproval.161

The legislative history is particularly revealing. The sponsors of the
bill did not intend the debate around the scope of “substantially the same
form” to apply to the generally applicable CRA statute.162 Indeed, Congress
intended for the agency to give effect to the joint resolution of disapproval
in conjunction with the law that authorized the disapproved rule to

160. See Congressional Review Act Legislative History, supra note 156.
161. 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; see also 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
162. See 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
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determine if there is room to issue a new rule.163 For this reason, a broader
organic statute would afford the agency more discretion for reissuing a new
rule after a disapproval than a more narrow organic statute.164
The legislative history of the CRA provides context for its purposeful
ambiguity.165 The meaning of “substantially the same form” will vary depending on the statute authorizing the agency to act.166 Congress did not
define “substantially the same form” or provide criteria to consider when
evaluating whether a reissued rule violates the CRA because it is a fact-specific inquiry. Every statute authorizing an agency to act will have a different
scope, and each invalidated rule will have different implications on what
constitutes “substantially the same.”167 The effect a joint resolution of disapproval has on future rules is dependent on the scope of the underlying
statute authorizing the agency to act, and not what “substantially the same
form” means within the CRA. Under these conditions, the future effects of
the CRA may look different depending on the authorizing statute and the
disapproved rule.168
Applying Chevron deference to reissued rules is consistent with the
text and with the legislative history. The agency would have to show that
the interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute and the joint
resolution of disapproval. To survive the standard, the agency must explain
why the reissued rule is not “substantially the same” as a rejected rule (giving effect to a resolution of disapproval). Applying Chevron deference as
the standard for reviewing reissued rules provides reviewing courts with a
workable standard, allows for agency action, and is consistent with the congressional intent of the CRA.
B. How Chevron Applies—An Illustrative Example
In 2015, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act (Pub. L.
No. 112-96) was amended to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing to determine eligibility for unemployment benefits.169 First, it expanded

163. See 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
164. See 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
165. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 4 (2014) (“[H]ow Congress makes
its purposes known, through text and reliable accompanying materials constituting legislative history, should be respected, lest the integrity of legislation be undermined.”).
166. See 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; see also 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
167. See 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; see also 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
168. See 142 CONG. REC. S3683–87; see also 142 CONG. REC. E571–79.
169. Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, § 2105,
126 Stat. 156, 162–63.
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the state option to use drug tests to disqualify Unemployment Compensation
(UC) applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer for unlawful drug use.170 Second, it allowed states to use
drug tests for UC applicants for whom suitable work is available only in an
occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor.171
The Department of Labor (the Department) promulgated rules under
the statute to implement the provisions related to drug testing applicants for
whom suitable work is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing.172 In the rule, the Department provided a list of the applicable occupations that regularly conduct drug testing.173 In the section
of the regulations following the list, the rule limited a state’s ability to conduct a drug test on UC applicants to those individuals who are only available
for work in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing.174 In effect,
this section limited a state’s ability to subject an individual to drug testing,
regardless of whether the individual’s previous occupation may have been
listed, as long as the individual was currently able, available, and searching
for work in at least one unlisted occupation.175
Stakeholders voiced concerns over the UC drug testing provisions and
the final rule.176 Some critics claimed that the rule did not address the policy
problem, and others wanted states to have more flexibility to implement
drug testing than what was offered under the Department’s rule.177 The disagreement with the Department’s rule led to the introduction of a CRA resolution. Supporters of the resolution argued that the intent of the underlying
law was “to provide states the ability to determine how best to implement
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 Provision on Establishing
Appropriate Occupations for Drug Testing of Unemployment Compensation Applicants, 81
Fed. Reg. 50298 (Emp. and Training Admin., Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Drug Testing
Regulations]; Allen Smith, DOL Makes It Easier to Drug Test Unemployment Compensation
Applicants, SHRM (Oct. 4, 2019) https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compl
iance/employment-law/pages/unemployment-compensation-drug-testing.aspx [https://perm
a.cc/CY3J-5KPG].
173. 2016 Drug Testing Regulations, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Letter from Scott Sanders, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n State Workforce Agencies, to Kevin Brady, Chairman, House Ways & Means Comm. (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www
.naswa.org/government-relations/congressional-testimony/naswa-support-letter-for-repealof-ui-drug-test-rule [https://perma.cc/S9BM-78K9].
177. See id.
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drug testing programs but the final regulation narrowed the law to circumstances where testing is legally required . . . and removed state discretion”
in conducting the UC program drug testing.178 Those arguing in opposition
to the resolution of disapproval said there was “no evidence unemployed
workers have higher rates of drug abuse than the general population.”179
The CRA joint resolution of disapproval passed the House and the Senate and was signed by President Trump in March 2017, thereby invalidating
the rule.180 Without the rule, there was no list of occupations requiring drug
testing, and the ability to prospectively test UC claimants based on occupation was no longer available to states.181 The underlying law still included
the provision that the Secretary of Labor could issue regulations regarding
states’ ability to drug test UC applicants from occupations designated by the
rule, but the CRA resolution made the future of rulemaking in this area unclear.182
In November 2018, the Department published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to reissue a rule pursuant to Pub. L. No. 112-96.183
The reissue requirements of the CRA prohibit an agency from reissuing a
rule in “substantially the same form” as the disapproved, unless the reissued
or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the
joint resolution disapproving the original rule.184 The statute was not repealed or amended following the joint resolution of disapproval, so the Department considered the underlying statute, the 2016 rule, and the congressional notice of disapproval.185
In the 2018 NPRM, the Department explained how the reissued rule
proposes a “substantially different and more flexible approach to the statutory requirements than the [2016 rule.]”186 The reissued rule would enable
states to enact legislation to require drug testing for a larger group of UC
applicants than the 2016 rule and lays out “a flexible standard that States

178. JULIE M. WHITTAKER & KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RECENT
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IN STATES’ ABILITY TO DRUG TEST
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION APPLICANTS AND BENEFIARIES 3 (2018).
179. Id.
180. S.J. Res. 23, 115th Cong. (2017).
181. WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 178, at 2.
182. See Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, §
2105, 126 Stat. 156, 162–63.
183. 2018 Drug Testing Regulations, supra note 172.
184. Id.; see also WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 178, at 3.
185. WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 178, at 2.
186. 2018 Drug Testing Regulations, supra note 172.
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can individually meet under the facts of their specific economies and practices.”187
The 2018 rule includes the same occupations listed in the invalidated
2016 rule and
also provides for two additional types of occupations: those identified by
state laws as requiring drug testing . . . and those where states have a “factual basis for finding that employers hiring employees in that occupation
conduct pre- or post-hire drug testing as a standard eligibility requirement
for obtaining or maintaining employment in that occupation.”188

This was the first time any agency had reissued a rule after the original
version was disapproved under the CRA.189 To date, the rule has not been
challenged for violating the “substantially the same form” provision.190 To
illustrate how a challenge would be considered under the framework provided in this paper, we assume a party has challenged the Department’s rule
as unlawful because of the previous CRA resolution.
First, the reviewing court would consider whether the administrative
interpretation at issue was issued by the agency charged with administering
the statute being construed. In this case, the Department had the authority
under Pub. L. No. 112-96 to issue regulations to determine the occupations
in which drug testing regularly occurs. Because the Department has the
authority to issue rules and interpret Pub. L. No. 112-96, the reviewing court
would apply Chevron to determine whether the agency’s interpretation
should be accorded deference.
The reviewing court will then look to the statute as effectively
amended by the joint resolution of disapproval. If the statute is unambiguous, and there is, for example, no room for the agency to regulate in light of
the joint resolution of disapproval, then the inquiry stops there. In that case,
the agency would be accorded no deference and the court would apply the
law as written. However, if there is ambiguity and Congress has not spoken
to the precise question through the statute and joint resolution of disapproval, then the reviewing court moves to Chevron step 2. In the drug testing example, the underlying statute granted broad authority to issue regulations to determine the occupations in which drug testing regularly occurs.
Additionally, the 2016 rule was struck down for the lack of flexibility the
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
WHITTAKER & ISAACS, supra note 178, at 3.
CAREY & DAVIS, supra note 89, at 19.
See id.
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rule gave to the states to determine how to implement the drug testing program. A reviewing court would likely find that the statute in conjunction
with the joint resolution of disapproval was ambiguous, and the agency had
room to interpret their authority to regulate in this area.
Last, a reviewing court would determine whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, even if the court would have chosen an alternative
interpretation. In the case of the drug-testing rule, the reviewing court
would consider whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute and the
joint resolution of disapproval was reasonable. In the NPRM, the Department explained how they approached the rulemaking in light of the invalidated 2016 rule.191 The Department structured the 2018 rule to set a flexible
standard for states to individually meet “under the facts of their specific
economies and practices.”192 The Department’s record of their reasoning
and substantially different scope and approach to the rulemaking would
likely be considered reasonable, and therefore the agency’s interpretation
would likely be accorded Chevron deference and the rule would survive the
challenge.193
The drug testing rule is a helpful example of how a reviewing court
could use Chevron deference to solve the problem of what “substantially
the same” means in a specific challenge. However, the drug-testing example is especially straightforward because there was legislative history to reveal what Congress disapproved of in the 2016 rule,194 the Department
clearly explained their approach to create a substantially different rule in the
NPRM,195 and the underlying statute was sufficiently broad to allow the
agency to make a rule after the 2017 joint resolution of disapproval.196 A
Chevron analysis may not be so easy to apply to different facts. For example, the underlying statute could be narrow, there could be a lack of legislative history explaining the reason for striking the previous rule,197 or the
191. 2018 Drug Testing Regulations, supra note 172.
192. Id.
193. It is worth noting that pursuant to the CRA, a reissued rule would still have to be
submitted to Congress for review and would potentially be subject to disapproval again. A
reviewing court may view Congress not issuing a joint resolution of disapproval is signaling
Congressional approval of the rule, therefore adding to the court’s confidence in the agency’s
reasonable interpretation.
194. See 163 CONG. REC. H1200–01 (2017).
195. See 2018 Drug Testing Regulations, supra note 172.
196. See Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, §
2105, 126 Stat. 156, 162–63.
197. If courts were to apply Chevron deference as the standard for reviewing reissued
rules, it would be beneficial for Congress to include a statement with the joint resolution of
disapproval explaining why the rule was struck down.
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agency could promulgate the reissued rule without giving context to the
changes made.
IV. DECLINING TO ACT: WHY COURTS SHOULD PERMIT AGENCY
INACTION UNLESS THERE IS A LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO ACT
A litigant could challenge an agency’s decision to withhold action pursuant to the CRA.198 In response, an agency will likely raise two defenses.199 Indeed, an agency declining to act would likely argue “that the
CRA resolution stripped the agency of its authority, and that the agency
would exercise discretion not to promulgate the new regulation even if the
CRA did not prevent it.”200 Each argument is addressed separately.
An agency will likely argue a CRA resolution effectively stripped its
regulatory authority over a given subject when it rejects a party’s rulemaking petition.201 Although a court reviewing an agency’s decision not to
promulgate a rule is “extremely limited” and “highly deferential,”202 this is
likely the weaker of the two arguments.203 The Supreme Court has
198. See Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21.
199. See id.
200. Id. An agency could also be subject to suit for failing to respond to a rulemaking
petition filed under 5 U.S.C. § 553(e). Indeed, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) permits a court to compel
agency action when it is “unreasonably delayed.” To determine whether agency action is
unreasonably delayed, courts use a fact-specific balancing test. See Telecomm. Rsch. &
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Under this analysis, the court considers whether Congress has indicated how quickly the agency should act, whether inaction
poses a threat to public health, whether an agency has competing priorities, what interests
would be prejudiced by agency delay, and whether the agency’s delay is within reason. Id.
Although courts may review agency action for unreasonable delay, courts are often reluctant
to compel agency action. See id. at 81 (holding FCC is required to submit reports documenting progress on resolution of refund disputes but declining to mandate immediate action after
five-year delay); see also In re Blue Water Network & Ocean Advocs., 234 F.3d 1305, 1315–
16 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (using TRAC factors to determine if agency action was unreasonably
delayed even though agency missed statutory deadline by eight years). In the event a court
compels a response to a rulemaking petition, the agency’s response would be a final agency
action subject to judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also Fox Television Stations,
Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
201. See Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21.
202. Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
203. This argument assumes the challenge to agency inaction occurs before the courts
determine the circumstances in which an agency’s reissuance of a rule violates the CRA’s
“substantially the same” prohibition. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). Indeed, if a party challenges
an agency’s inaction after the courts give meaning to the “substantially the same form” prohibition, an agency’s better argument for inaction may be that it lacks regulatory authority.
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previously rejected an agency’s contention that it lacked regulatory authority over a given subject matter and directed the agency to reconsider adopting a particular regulation.204 Accordingly, a court could reject an agency’s
contention that a CRA resolution stripped its regulatory authority over a
given subject matter, find the litigant’s proposed rule is not “substantially”
similar to a nullified rule, and direct an agency to “consider the merits of a
new regulation.”205 While this does not necessarily require an agency to
adopt a new rule, it requires additional consideration of a litigant’s proposed
rule.206
An agency contending it is exercising regulatory discretion not to act
when confronted with the contention that action is being unlawfully withheld is likely the better argument.207 The Supreme Court has held that a
challenge to agency inaction “can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that
an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to
take.”208 This is a high bar for a complainant to overcome. Indeed, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals has even held that the term “shall” may be an insufficient indication that an agency is required to act.209 Given the significant “discretion not to undertake a rulemaking process,”210 an agency would
be inclined to defend a litigant’s claim that it is withholding promulgation
of a rule by arguing it is doing so pursuant to its regulatory discretion.211
Further, unlike the previous argument, this argument permits an agency to
retain broader regulatory authority because it does not force the agency to
concede that a CRA resolution has reduced its regulatory authority.212 Thus,
an agency contending it is exercising discretion when it declines to reissue

For the purposes of this Article, however, we assume the courts have not defined the meaning
of the CRA’s “substantially the same form” prohibition.
204. See Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).
205. Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21.
206. See Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 533 (noting an agency can still avoid rulemaking
in its regulatory area “if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will
not exercise” its rulemaking discretion).
207. See Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21. But see supra note 203 and accompanying text.
208. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
209. Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 856–57 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
210. Batkins & White, supra note 143, at 21.
211. See id.
212. See id. (noting an agency defending inaction on the grounds that it lacks regulatory
authority after a joint resolution necessarily concedes it has lost some regulatory authority it
may have otherwise retained).
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a rule potentially barred under the CRA can both defend its inaction and
retain regulatory authority it may want in the future.213
CONCLUSION
The once-obscure CRA emerged as a potent oversight tool in 2017.
While this emergence discounted claims that it was ineffective, its frequent
use has generated legal uncertainty surrounding the “substantially the same
form” provision. This Article reframes the question surrounding the meaning of “substantially the same form” and provides a workable standard for
courts to evaluate reissued agency rules on a case-by-case basis, therefore
addressing some of the questions pertaining to the CRA’s effect on future
rulemaking.

213. Id.
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